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Leonardo PARRI, 2014, Explanation in the Social Sciences. A Theoretical and Empirical
Introduction, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 254 p.
1 The aim of Leonardo Parri’s book is “the revitalization” (p.10) of the concept of social
law.  However,  his  support  of  the indispensability  of  social  laws in order to explain
social facts doesn’t imply that the standard model should be that of the hard natural
sciences (ch.6).  One has instead to turn towards soft  natural  sciences,  like geology,
climatology,  etc.,  which deal  statistically  with  high complexity  phenomena.  Let  me
consider the author’s arguments.
2 In the first three chapters, Parri sums up the role of theories and laws in scientific
inferences and conciliates philosophical realism with the impossibility of theory-free
empirical observations. Following a path linking Durkheim with John Searle, he then
admits the possibility of a social ontology, i.e. the conception of the social as an
objective emergent reality, in spite of its undeniable social constructive character. On
these bases, in ch. 4 the author is more precise about his revitalization of the concept of
social law. With stringent references to Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, as well as
to Karl Popper, Parri situates the so-called covering law model, i.e. the core of
nomological explanation, within the domain of inductive-statistical explanation (p.71).
The revitalized social  laws are,  thus,  probabilistic ones.  Consequently,  following the
arguments of authors like Charles-Henry Cuin, Parri can relax the caveat which led
Raymond Boudon, Jon Elster and John H. Goldthorpe to discriminate between laws and
models, in order to account for the differences between natural and social knowledge.
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According to Parri, types and models are basically nomological products and implicitly
presuppose the existence of probabilistic laws (p. 127).
3 The covering law model in the domain of the inductive-statistical explanation infers its
explanandum—e.g. the free riding level in an association which supplies public goods—
from preceding conditions— the association size, the amount of its selective incentives
—by means of  a  probabilistic  covering law, Mancur Olson’s  law (p.73-74).  Thus,  the
why-questions  concerning  a  “what?”,  the  free  riding  level,  are  answered  by  the
establishment of causal probabilistic connections between macro phenomena. In ch. 5
and 7 Parri clarifies that the probabilistic laws which answer why-questions aren’t self-
sufficient, they in fact “only partially open” (p.82, a vague statement, indeed) the black
box of the causal processes which produce the macro-connections. Thus, in agreement
with Hempel and Oppenheim, but also with Wesley C. Salmon and Mario Bunge, the
author states that, in order to enter the black box, the answers to the why-questions
have to be complemented with the analysis of micro mechanisms (that are themselves
also ruled by laws), which can answer the how-questions (p.82-84). For example, in the
inferences  based  on  Olson’s  law,  one  has  to  look  into  the  individual  decisions  and
actions  of  both  the  associational  leaders  and  potential  members  (p.85).  It  is  thus
possible to integrate the probabilistic covering laws with methodological individualism
and analytical sociology. This becomes clearer in the final chapter, where the Weber-
Boudon’s model connecting micro and macro and the well-known James S. Coleman’s
boat  are  discussed.  Microfoundations  are  further  inquired  in  ch. 8,  devoted  to
intentional explanation, which rests on probabilistic covering laws derived from the
theory of instrumental or value-rational action (p.180).
4 The enlightenment of the unescapable role of nomological knowledge in all kinds of
inferences  and  in  intentional  explanation,  allows  Parri  in  ch. 9  to  criticize  the
historicist divide between history and social sciences. It is in fact now easy to show the
epistemic impossibility of the radical inductivism cum empiricism of historicism, as
well as the groundlessness of its pretense to dispense with nomological explanations,
due to the fact that historians deal with the intentions of real actors (p.184-189). Parri
shows that history is a social science, even though a sui generis one. It in fact resorts to
theories  and  laws,  explicitly  in  structural  history  and tacitly  in  more  descriptive
analytical narrations (p.193). On these bases, I think it is possible to look for synergies
between  history  and  analytical  sociology.  The  latter  fosters  an  evidence-based
nomological  knowledge,  which  can  be  used  by  history  to  achieve  its  goal:  the
connection of the relevant events in a complete and intelligible detailed description. On
the other hand, such circumstantial historical descriptions, built on theories and laws,
give analytical sociology useful elements for the contextualization of its models and the
establishment  of  the  appropriate  ceteris  paribus conditions.  This  would  avoid  the
possibility  that  sociological  formalization  ends  up,  as  Goldthorpe  fears,  in  a  sterile
“sociological dandyism” without substantial relevance.
5 All in all, the book provides an Arianna’s thread for facing the labyrinth of the abstract
questions  concerning  the  ontological  and  epistemological  foundations  of  the  social
sciences.  The  scope  of  this  achievement  stands  out  if  one  considers  that  in
contemporary  sociology  there  is  an  inclination  to  appreciate  extremely  subjective
sociological  narrations,  because  of  their  critical  significance,  i.e. their  capability  of
making public opinion aware of major social problems. Parri himself observes that, in
the last quarter of the 20th century, sociology, together with anthropology, fell prey to
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this  post-modernist  trend  more  than  economics  and  political  science  (p.53).
Scientifically-inclined sociologists are thus pushed, by the rhetoric prevailing in their
own field,  to  justify their  scientific  orientation.  However,  their  effort  to argue in a
systematic way in favor of a scientific approach implies the risk of being entrapped in
complex  questions  of  philosophy  of  science.  Paradoxically,  the  scientific-inclined
sociologist is thus pushed away from the basic messages of Robert K. Merton’s Social
Theory and Social Structure, which spurs to link theory and research, not to focus solely
on theories detached from empirical observations, not to read only research books, but
to maintain a practical research engagement. From this point of view, Parri’s book is an
excellent  contribution  to  the  philosophy  of  social  sciences.  Moreover,  some  of  its
properties make the book useful for the social scientist who wants to move away from
the dilemmas of the philosophy of social science in a conscious and non-skeptical way,
in  order  to  practice  empirical  research.  In  this  respect,  the  fact  that  Parri  is  a
sociologist helps. His competences help us link, thanks to several examples taken from
empirical research, the postulates of the tradition of analytical philosophy (from Hume
to Popper, Hempel, Searle, Hare, Bunge, etc.) to the models of the social processes of
Boudon’s  La  Place  du  désordre and  Coleman’s  Foundations  of  Social  Theory.  The
implications of the examined epistemological and ontological questions become thus
transparent for the sociologist and the advanced student of sociology.
6 Still, for a reader engaged in the problems of sociological theory and research, the book
leaves  some  relevant  questions  open.  Let’s  begin  with  the  concept  of  uncertainty.
Parri’s  central  thesis  is  that  the  empirical  laws  of  the  social  sciences  can  only  be
probabilistic,  given the  impossibility  of  establishing strict  ceteris  paribus conditions,
able to halt the influence of “other relevant causes and disturbing factors” (p.99, p.127).
Thus,  uncertainty  seems  first  of  all  due  to  the  sociologist’s  difficulty  of  having  a
synoptic  vision  of  social  reality  (on  its  own  ontologically  certain),  given  the  high
number of dimensions which constitute it. If this were the problem of uncertainty, the
progress  of  nomological  knowledge  in  sociology  would  mainly  be  a  question  of
improving survey devices and data bases, of dealing with the problems of undetected
heterogeneity  (e.g.  by  means  of  longitudinal  data),  of  taking  contextual  differences
more into account (e.g. thanks to multilevel analysis). However, this is not the case if
one assumes that social  reality is  ontologically uncertain,  as Parri  himself  seems to
admit  in  his  “La  sociologia  economica  tra  le  mura  dell’ordine  e  le  scosse  dell’incertezza”
(Rassegna italiana di  sociologia,  v.  41/1,  2000).  In this  case,  the progress of  the social
scientific nomological knowledge depends on the capability to model uncertainty, that
is  to account for the mechanisms which generate it.  This would imply and deserve
different kinds of methodological implications.
7 The issue of modeling uncertainty is linked to a second question left open by Parri:
value rationality. The author asserts that an actor aiming at a value performs, in a new
or changed situation, a sort of rational calculation in order to identify the best means
to realize it (p.172-173). However, this neglects the fact that a “value stance” refers to
the “others” and can be conceived like a situation which Randall Collins defines as a
“ritual”. In this situation, the sacred character of the pursued value-aim permeates the
process which realizes it and, thereby, the involved means. In value-oriented actions,
the resort to certain means can thus be considered like following a constitutive rule of
the actor’s identity. In such a symbolically structured domain of action, it is improbable
that the adoption of another rule in a changed situation could be considered like a
neutral “technical” choice, which doesn’t in any way devalue the excluded alternatives.
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Therefore, the existence of a symbolic pattern, which connects a value with its means
of realization, risks giving a problem of adaptation the meaning of a “reconversion”.
This could engender identity crises and open areas of uncertainty for the actors, similar
e.g. to “Buridan’s ass” situations. Value rationality could thus work as a mechanism
generating ontological uncertainty in the social reality emerging from the interactions
among  actors,  independently  of  the  problems  linked  to  scientific  observation.  The
modeling  of  this  process  should  thus  include  Collins’  theory  of  rituals  and  be
considered by Parri’s theses on value rationality.
8 The third question left open in the book concerns the techniques used for modeling
social processes. Parri says that social experiments are impossible (p. 92, p.127). The
social sciences would be in fact unable to create the artificial conditions which isolate
the  relevant  relation  from  confusing  factors,  to  define  reliable  counterfactual
circumstances, to show in vitro that theoretical laws can generate the desired empirical
configurations.  Parri  seems  skeptical  vis-à-vis  the  various  experimental  techniques
used by the social sciences. Although he treats models like the Schelling’s residential
segregation one (p.136), he doesn’t consider the agent-based models used in analytical
sociology. Still,  resorting to these models and experiments is important; in fact, the
analysis of individual choices and their consequences requires distancing oneself from
the atomistic modeling of rational choice. Furthermore, as showed by Peter Abell et al.
(“Microfoundations of Social Theory”, Sociologica, 2014/2), the difficulty in resorting to
rational  choice  models  reduces  the  explanatory  power  of  probabilistic  macro  laws.
Hence, it seems there is a tight relation among: i) the microfoundation of probabilistic
covering  laws,  stressed  by  Parri  himself;  ii)  the  difficulties  in  using  the  standard
rational choice theory for these microfoundations; iii) the resort to agent-based models
and experiments. This relation should be more closely inquired.
9 To sum up, the need to go deeper into the three “open questions” I pointed out doesn’t
challenge  the  framework  of  Explanation  in  the  Social  Sciences.  On  the  contrary,  it  is
thanks to the clarity of the book, that the three questions emerge and can easily be
linked to the epistemological and ontological bases of the social sciences.
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